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TOURNAmENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW
FIRM. By Marc Galantert and Thomas M. Palay.tt Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. ix, 189. $27.50.*
Reviewed by Vincent Robert Johnson*
I. Focusing on Large Firms
Viewed from any perspective, the larget American law firm is a
major player, a dominant feature on the legal landscape. Typically housed
in comfortable quarters and often with offices in several cities, large law
firms exert an enormous influence on the operation of the legal system.
Their attorneys bring to the representation of clients not merely legal
talent, but business connections, financial resources, and legions of support
personnel. By using those assets, large firms play a leading role in
defining the tone and pace of professional life. Serving the interests of
mainly corporate clients, these firms' actions influence the content of the
law, the ethics of lawyering, and the public's expectations about the legal
profession.2
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1. The terms "large" and "big" are used interchangeably herein to describe law firms. As
Galanter and Palay write, "The big firm consists of a 'large' number of lawyers-just how many is
'large' depends upon the place and time." P. 2; see infra note 30.
Between 1978 and 1990, "the number of firms with more than 100 lawyers increased five-fold
.... [And the] number of lawyers in [those] firms jumped from 6,558 to 51,851." Stephanie B.
Goldberg, Then and Now: 75 Years of Change, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 56, 59. More recent statistics
indicate that, as of September 1990, 3 firms numbered over 1000 attorneys. See The NA! 250, NAT'L
L.J, Sept. 24, 1990 (Supp.), at S4, S4. The top 253 firms each had at least 131 attorneys, and 149
firms had 200 or more lawyers. Id. at S4-S13.
2. Whether large firm lawyers are able and willing to influence the actions of their clients, rather
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Not surprisingly, large law firms have begun to attract considerable
attention from both lay and expert observers.' Newspapers chronicle their
successes and failures;4 scholars study issues endemic to large firm
than merely to serve their clients' expressed interests, is an important and disputed question. Notre
Dame's Thomas Shaffer asserts that "the lawyer in modem business practice in the United States is a
sotirce of moral guidance for his clients" and that "business clients follow the moral advice of their
lawyers." THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 132-33 (1987). On the same theme
in an earlier book, Shaffer wrote:
[L]aw-office conversations are almost always moral conversations. This is so because
they involve law; law is a claim which people make on one another-that is, a claim
resting on obligation, a moral claim-and for which they may seek the sanction and
coercion of the state ....
... The story of any lawyer's life is a story of moral influence on clients-sometimes
paternal, sometimes what I am here calling conscientious objection, sometimes a deeper influence
which depends on conversation. To suppose that clients are morally isolated, and that lawyers
are incapable of changing the consciences of clients, is not truthful. Isolation as a moral idea
is therefore inadequate ....
THOMAS SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRIsrIAN AND A LAWYER 10, 18 (1981).
In contrast, Stanford's Robert Gordon has interpreted the writing of several authors as tentatively
concluding that, on thewhole, outside lawyers (as opposedto in-house corporate counsel) "have neither
the opportunity nor the desire to reshape their clients' business or political goals and chiefly confine
their [lawyering] role to that of technical execution." Robert W. Gordon, Introduction to Symposium,
The Corporate Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271,274 (1985) (discussing four articles: Abram Chayes
& Antonio H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277 (1985);
Robert A. Kagan & Robert E. Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37
STAN. L. REv. 399 (1985); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1985); and Edward
0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Washington Lawyers and Others: The Structure of Washington
Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1985)).
Others also dispute Shaffer's view. For example, Margali Larson of Temple states:
[Miany large firm lawyers find it presumptuous to make moral judgments for their clients
.... [They tend to deny that ethical conflicts are an inevitable component of corporate
practice, and they accept the reduction of ethics to legality because they know that their
clients hire them precisely to "keep them out of trouble." If this is a shocking state of
affairs, it does not seem either new or likely to have ever been substantially different.
Margali S. Larson, On the Nostalgic View of Lawyers'Role: Comment on Kagan and Rosen's "On the
Social Significance ofLarge Law Firm Practice," 37 STAN. L. REV. 445, 455 (1985).
I have discussed other aspects of the influence of large firms elsewhere. See Vincent R. Johnson
& Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation ofthe Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359 (1990).
[E]vents which affect larger firms have a "trickle down" effect. Many attorneys move
from larger firms to smaller practices; thehigh media profile of larger firms shapespublic
and professional expectations; the litigation and negotiation tactics of larger firms force
smaller ones to respond in kind; and, as has long been the case, attorneys in larger firms
frequently play leading roles in defining and applying the ethical standards which govern
the entire profession.
Id. at 364-65 (footnotes omitted).
3. The recency of this development is suggested by the fact that as late as 1985 Robert Gordon
wrote of the "almost unmapped interior of American society, its large metropolitan law firms."
Gordon, supra note 2, at 271. He noted that "it seems astonishing that law firms should have for so
long remained almost unexplored in legal scholarship." Id.
4. The legal work and internal operations of large firms is a staple of the daily "Law" column in
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practice;' and books are published about the men and women who
populate this elite sphere.6 The attention lavished upon large firms thus
far has tended to be atomistic, often focusing upon isolated issues or
events, with little attention paid to historical roots or theoretical founda-
tions.7 However, a small number of more comprehensive works have also
emerged. They include Richard Abel's American Lawyers,8 a book
the Wall Street Journal. See, e.g., Wade Lambert & Arthur Hayes, Westward Bound, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 29, 1991, at B6 (discussing a 180-lawyer firm's opening of a new branch office); Amy Marcus
& Ellen J. Pollock, SkaddenArps Is Slimming Down by lOOLawyers-Temporarily, WALL ST. J., Jan.
23, 1991, at B2 (discussing the efforts of the 1 100-lawyer firm to encourage less productive lawyers
to leave); Pauline Yoshihashi & Sonja Nazario, Hourly Billing Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1991, at
B5 (discussing decisions by managing partners of large law firms not to raise 1990 billing rates).
Longer articles on similar topics may be found in virtually any issue of such trade tabloids as
National Law Journal, Legal Tunes, or Texas Lawyer. See, e.g., Gary Taylor, Houston's Wood
Lucksinger May Merge, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 2; Eleanor Kerlow, Sutherland, Asbill at the
Crossroads, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 1; Amy Boardman, Ax Falls at Gardere & Wynne, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 18, 1991, at 1.
Of course, similar fare may be found in professional magazines. See, e.g., Don I. DeBenedictis,
Record-Setting Merger in California, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 40, 40 (discussing the formation of the
fifth-largest law firm).
5. "Since 1980, at least a dozen articles on law firms have appeared in mainstream law reviews."
S.S. Samuelson & L.J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U. L. REV. 185,
186 n.7 (1990); see, e.g., Symposium, The Corporate Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1985)
(exploring recent developments in corporate law firms as a starting point for scholarly analysis); M.
Peter Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law Firm Disqualification When a Personally
Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399, 399 (1990) (arguing that current
conflict of interest rules should be changed to reflect the fact that "[llaw firms in the United States are
expanding rapidly .... [and 1lawyers ... are moving between law firms more frequently than ever
before"); cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 544 (1988) (suggesting that "at least under some circumstances, the
larger law practice will be subject to its own rules"); Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm
Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, andDisciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients] (discussing client solicitation
by departing attorneys-an issue confronted by firms of all sizes, but especially significant for larger
firms).
6. See, e.g., KIM I. EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF FINLEY
KUMELE, ONE OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW FIRMS (1990); JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE
SUPERLAwYERs: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS
(1971); STEVEN KUMBLE & KEVIN J. LAHART, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE RISE AND RUIN OF
FINLEY, KUMBLE (1990); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE
GIANT LAW FIRMS (1987); JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL
LAW FIRMS (1983).
7. See Michael Ariens, Just a Bigger Fish, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 329, 331-32 (1991) (reviewing
EISLER, supra note 6) (criticizing Eisler's chronicle of Finley Kumble for failing to investigate the
broader context of changes in the American legal profession); cf. Gordon, supra note 2, at 273 ("The
new legal journalism has its weak points, mostly those inherent in the form: the natural tendencies to
dwell on personalities at the expense of structures, to be unable to resist repeating any quotable remark,
and to glamorize its subjects sometimes to the point of absurdity.").
8. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989). For a review ofAmerican Lawyers, see John
S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its Reform, 68 TEXAS L. REV.
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devoting considerable attention to large firms as part of an extensively
documented treatment of the legal profession, and Robert Nelson's
Partners With Power,9 a study focusing on large firms as social institu-
tions.
Against this background of increasing interest in large law firms,
Professors Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay of the University of Wis-
consin Law School have published Tournament of Lawyers: The Transfor-
mation of the Big Law Firm. Their book, which expands and refines the
arguments in their .recent Virginia Law Review article,1" ranks with
Abel's and Nelson's works as part of a growing body of scholarly literature
that seeks to understand the ongoing metamorphosis of the American legal
profession."1 In contrast to such recent books as Kim Eisler's Shark
Tank 2 and Steven Kumble and Kevin Lahart's Conduct Unbecoming,"
both of which deal with the meteoric rise and precipitous decline of the
Finley Kumble megafirm, and James Stewart's The Partners,' which a
few years earlier discussed large firm lawyering in general, Tournament of
Lawyers has nothing to say about the "passion and politics of particular
firms, clients, and controversies." 5 Instead, the book focuses on the
"less dramatic but fundamental patterns of [law firm] organization and
growth" 6 for the purpose of understanding the "structural changes that
are transforming big firms and their world in fundamental ways."' 7
451, 453 (1989) (reviewing ABEL, supra) (describing Abel's book as a "powerful and eloquent...
seminal work").
9. NELSON, supra note 6.
10. Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth ofLarge La, Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990). Their article parallels
those sections of the book that explain their theory of exponential law firm growth. The book's
extensive treatment of the history and traditional structure of large firms, and the appendices presenting
data from the authors' empirical research, are among the features of the book that substantially expand
the scope of the article.
11. The task of tracking and critically evaluating changes in the legal profession is formidable.
See Robert F. Drinan, MoralArchitects pr Selish Schemers?, 79 GEO. L.J. 389, 394 (1990) (" E]ven
the most well-informed are experiencing [difficulty] in trying to understand what is happening to the
legal profession in America. The numbers alone are staggering.").
12. EISLER, supra note 6.
13. KUMBLE & LAHART, supra note 6.
14. STEWART, supra note 6.
15. P. x. The preface to Tournament of Lawyers does contain a brief, thoughtful discussion of
the television series L.A. Law (NBC). The authors suggest that McKenzie Brackman, the small law
firm that is the focus of that series, is really a "homunculus, a miniaturized large firm," p. ix, "the
large firm scaled down to faces that we can remember and causes that we can understand." P. x.
They argue that L.A. Law "is important for us because it marks the arrival of the lawfirm (as opposed
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Galanter and Palay's basic argument is that traditional law firm
promotion practices make growth in firm size inevitable and that such
growth is linked to many recent developments, including increased lateral
hiring,"8 the creation of tiered partnerships,19 and the collapse of entire
firms.' According to the authors, "the relentless increase in the size of
firms ... is neither an incidental feature [of contemporary law practice]
nor merely the result of the play of external forces." 2 Rather, large firm
growth is an expression of the "fundamental structure of the law firm that
crystallizes around the exchange between senior and junior lawyers. " '
Elaborating upon this theme, Galanter and Palay write:
[T]he changes the big firm is undergoing grow out of the seeds
planted by its early pioneers. We believe that the big firm, compris-
ing partners and associates who are incipient partners, contains an
inherent dynamic of growth. This dynamic is a by-product of what
we call the promotion-to-partner tournament. Historically, the big
law firm has structured attorney compensation and incentives around
a promotion contest, which has proven to be a simple device for
fostering the efficient sharing of human capital. But along with
efficient governance has come growth. If the environment permits,
the firm that employs such a tournament will tend to grow exponen-
tially. Growth changes the character of the firm. Informality
recedes; collegiality gives way; notions of public service and
independence are marginalized; the imperative of growth collides
with notions of dignified passivity in obtaining business. Eventually
the firm faces the necessity of either reorganizing to support ever-
larger increments of growth or reorganizing to suppress growth.'
While acknowledging that lamentations about commercialism and loss of
professional virtue have recurred regularly for a century,' the authors
opine that this time the crisis may be real; the "wolf" may in fact be at the
door of the large firm.' The exponential character of law firm growth
means that inevitable structural modifications will be far greater than in
18. See p. 54.
19. See p. 122.
20. Seep. 55 n.120.
21. P.x.
22. Id.
23. P. 3 (footnote omitted).
24. See pp. 3, 36, 68-69; see also p. 17 (observing that Professor A.A. Berle noted in 1933 the
"abandonment of the notion that the lawyer 'was an officer of the court and therefore an integral part
of the scheme ofjustice' and its replacement by a notion of the lawyer as a 'paid servant of his client'"
(quoting Adolph A. Berle, Modern Legal Profession, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
340, 343 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933))).
25. See pp. 3, 69.
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years past.' At the same time, greater dissemination of information
about the legal profession in general and about law firms in particular
makes it more difficult for firms to avoid challenges to traditional modes
of operation. 7
II. History and Transition
The validity of the authors' exponential growth thesis is open to
question on a variety of grounds. As discussed below, their theory is
predicated upon unreasonable assumptions about the economic rationality
of large firm lawyers, the stability and prosperity of the firms to which
they belong, and the public demand for the services that those enterprises
produce.' Moreover, the authors' theory attempts to explain only those
patterns of growth occurring in firms in which growth is largely a product
of internal promotion processes; the many (and increasing) instances of
growth as a product of law firm mergers and other nontraditional modes
of expansion are largely ignored. 9 Nevertheless, Tournament of Lawyers
must be credited with significant achievements relating largely to the
book's marshaling of the evidence. In the course of one slim volume,
Galanter and Palay present a rich history of the large law firm and its role
in American society. Drawing upon numerous sources, the authors trace
the growth of the big firm from its early days at the turn of the century
(when "big" referred to a firm with four or more attorney) through its
"golden age" circa 1960 (when life was "prosperous, stable, and untrou-
bled"31) and ultimately on through the hyper-competitive 1980s32 (when
26. Seep. 69.
27. See id.; see also p. 72 ("Over the past twenty-five years, the development of new lines of
scholarship about the law in action made available a profusion of information about the working
routines of courts and judges, about the work of lawyers, the structure and politics of the bar, the
impact of legal regulation, and so forth.").
28. See infra subpart ImI(C).
29. Galanter and Palay sum up the parameters of their project as follows:
[W]e... have not attempted to describe every conceivablebig firm, only the promotion-
to-partnership firm based on the promotion-to-partner tournament. Firms can be large
without being promotion-to-partnership firms. Examples include the national multibranch
law firms such as Hyatt Legal Services and Jacoby & Myers, which have an administra-
tive hierarchy and large numbers of salaried lawyers, and which market standardized legal
services to individuals.
P. 108 n.59. Also notably absent from the authors' study was Finley Kumble. Founded in the late
1960s, Finley Kumble had become one of the largest law firms in America before its demise in the late
1980s. See STEVENS, supra *note 6, at 38. Its growth had relied little upon internal promotion
processes, focusing instead on lateral hiring of partners and mergers with established firms. Galanter
and Palay say that "Finley, Kumble was omitted [from their study] because its growth history was too
short for [their] purposes." P. 143 n.8.
30. In 1892, 87 firms had 4 or more lawyers. By 1903 that number had climbed to 210. P. 15.
31. P. 20.
32. See generally Johnson & Coyle, supra note 2, at 363, 367-69 & n.34 (discussing the rapid
[Vol. 70:537
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lateral hiring, "headhunters," and branch offices33 became common and
when many large firms merged, split up, or dissolved').
Galanter and Palay begin by considering the unique style of practice
that has characterized large firms. Discussing the differing status of
partners and other large firm attorneys, the types of clients, the nature of
the work, the support systems, and the kinds of information used to render
legal services,3" the authors contrast large firms with other types of
practice. They argue that, while "any of these features can be found apart
from the whole cluster,... the cluster hangs together in a way that gives
the big firm a distinctive institutional character-a character that is
changing as these features are rearranged." 3"
The authors consider in detail selective hiring37 and promotion
practices38 which succeeded, during the first half of this century, in
making the big firm the "dominant kind of law practice"39 and in setting
an "industry standard"' that has been "emulated in other practice
settings,"41 both in the United States and abroad.42 Using as their
benchmark a hypothesized golden age of the big firm circa 1960, the
authors then chart the transformation of legal institutions generally, and of
the large firm specifically, during the past generation. Detailing the
changes in lawyering in the 1980s, including increased competition in "both the marketing of legal
services and the recruitment, training and retention of competent lawyers" (footnotes omitted)).
33. See pp. 47-48, 54.
34. See pp. 54-55 & n.120; see also Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 5, at
6 (discussing split-offs, break-ups, and lateral hiring).
35. See pp. 4-9.
36. P. 4.
37. See pp. 23-26.
38. See pp. 26-32.
39. P. 20.
40. P. 14.
41. P. 18; see p. 2 ("Like the hospital as a way to practice medicine, the big firm provides the
standard format for delivering complex services .... The specialized boutique firm, the public-interest
law firm, the corporate law department-all model themselves on a style of practice developed in the
large firm.").
42. See pp. 2, 18-19.
43. Of the large law firm circa 1960, Galanter and Palay write: "The form had been tested; it was
well established; it exercised an unchallenged dominance. It was a time of stable relations with clients,
of steady but manageable growth, of comfortable assurance that an equally bright future lay ahead."
P. 20.
Detailing the characteristics of that golden age is a challenging task, for during that era "[llarge-
firm law practice was ... shrouded in confidentiality." P. 69. Indeed, according to some sources,
confidentiality of information about the operation of large firms continued well into the 1970s. Thus,
one author recently wrote:
It hardly seems possible in 1989, when journalists often can't get lawyers off the phone,
but in 1979 most corporate lawyers wouldn't even return a phone call from a reporter
... The top salaries of law partners, unlike those of Fortune 500 executives, was
one of the most tightly held secrets in American business. Nor did anyone have a clue
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forces behind the transformation and the efforts of firms to cope with
resulting pressures,4' the authors conclude:
[L]arge law firms find themselves in an environment with more
lawyers, competing with more large firms like themselves, all
supplied with more technological infrastructure, involved in more
contested activity in more varied arenas with more contenders, using
a larger, more indeterminate and more diffusely bounded body of
legal knowledge. 6
Assessing the present state of affairs, Galanter and Palay write:
about the profits of the top firms ....
Information about clients was also a closely kept secret. ... All business affairs
were held closely under wraps ....
EIsLER, supra note 6, at 112-15.
Nevertheless, based upon a copious review of extant literature, Galanter and Palay sketch the
chief outlines of large firm lawyering at the dawn of the 1960s. See generally pp. 24-32.
44. According to the authors:
In the course of [the past] twenty-five years, there has been a great change in scale of
many aspects of the legal world: the amount and complexity of legal regulation; the
frequency of litigation; the amount and tenor of authoritative legal material; the number,
coordination, and productivity of lawyers; the number of legal actors and the resources
they devote to legal activity; the amount of information about law and the velocity with
which it circulates.
P. 37.
The authors observe that recent decades have brought a "rapid succession of new technologies,"
p. 42, such as photoreproduction, computerization, electronic mail, and fax machines, and that the size
of the profession multiplied: "[n]ot only were there more lawyers, but they were younger, less
experienced, better educated, and more diverse in background and outlook than their predecessors."
P. 39. Simultaneously, there was a "general shift to larger units of practice" as more attorneys worked
in larger firms. P. 45. Client relationships also tended to be less enduring, as corporations employed
increased numbers of in-house counsel who frequently exercised greater scrutiny over retained outside
attorneys, often relegating big firms to work on "task-specific ad hoe engagements." P. 50.
Competitive pressures were exacerbated by Supreme Court decisions striking down minimum
fee schedules and permitting lawyer advertising, Seep. 52 n.100. While rulings allowing lawyers to
advertise made it possible for consumers to obtain information about legal services, the rulings had the
added effect of unleashing a torrent of facts principally of interest to lawyers. Attorneys were no
longer afraid to talk to the press for fear of being charged with attempting to circumvent advertising
restrictions, and a variety of publications beganto carry a "steady diet of detailed backstageinformation
about firm structure, hiring policy, marketing strategies, clients, fees, and compensation." P. 71
(footnote omitted). The result was a new profession-wide interest in staying equal with, or ahead of,
other firms. See pp. 52-53.
45. To copewith competitive pressures, big firms developed lavish summer recruitment programs,
see p. 55, raised salaries, see pp. 56-57, increased associate-to-partner ratios, see p. 59, launched
aggressive marketing campaigns, see p. 53, created partnership tiers, see p. 58, increased reliance on
nonlawyer personnel, see p. 65, and broadened their services to include such "non-legal" businesses
as investment advice, economic consulting, and real estate development, see p. 66. In addition, large
firms sought to operate more like the businesses they predominantly served. As Galanter and Palay
write of the modern legal profession: "Firms rationalize their operations; they engage professional
managers and consultants; firm leaders worry about billable hours, profit centers, and marketing
strategies." P. 52.
46. P. 45.
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[f]n the early 1990s we find that the big firm of the first two-thirds
of the century is becoming something else. The large agglomeration
of specialist lawyers organized around the "promotion to partnership
tournament" is still there-indeed it is much larger. But a cadre of
permanent salaried personnel (paralegals, second-tier associates, and
permanent associates/senior attorneys) now surrounds that promotion-
to-partnership core. Within the core, promotion comes to fewer
entry-level associates and it often comes later. For those who
achieve promotion, the meaning of partnership has changed. The
prospect of an orderly procession to unassailable eminence has been
replaced by entrance to an arena of pressure and risk amid frenetic
movement.47
Admittedly, it is possible to find in the works of other writers'
portions of the story tracing the birth and growth of large law firms and
their recent transformation into what Galanter and Palay refer to as the
"Later Big Firm." 49 Yet Tournament of Lawyers is notable by reason of
its comprehensive treatment of the subject and because of the clarity,
richness, and efficiency with which the story is told. So, too, the ground
covered by the book is not so familiar, nor are the authors' fresh insights
so infrequent, that the journey is uninteresting. For example, Galanter and
Palay take special care to dispel misconceptions concerning the rigidity
with which the "up-or-out" promotion policy-a basic element of the big
firm structure-was applied in years past.' They document several
47. Pp. 75-76.
48. See, e.g., Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law
Firm, 1870-1915, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CmL WAR AMERICA 3 (Gerard W.
Gawalt ed., 1984) (discussing the early American law firm); WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SoCIETY 1890-1930, at 141-209 (Harold Hyman &
Stuart Bruchey eds., 1986) (chronicling the rise of large law firms); JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 306-08 (1950) (discussing the rise of metropolitan law firms);
Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983)
(developing the history of legal practice from 1870 to 1920); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUE PRINT FOR THE
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONAuSM 1-9 (1986) (discussing changes that have affected the legal
profession generally in the past 25 years); Michael S. Ariens, A Uniform Rule Governing the Admission
and Practice ofAttorneys Before United States District Courts, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 649-51 (1986)
(describing increased attorney mobility and the growth of interstate law practice); Johnson & Coyle,
supra note 2, at 360-64 (discussing law firms' increasing use of staff attorneys, of-counsel positions,
and temporary lawyers to remain competitive).
49. Pp. 75-76; see infra note 150 (describing the "Later Big Firm").
50. See p. 28 ("Mhe 'up-or-out' rule ... prescribes that after a probationary period the young
lawyer will be admitted to partnership or will leave the firm.").
In a particularly interesting passage, Galanter and Palay take the position that "[tihough it has
been the typical practice, there is no intrinsic reason that ... firms must fire the losers" of the
promotion-to-partner tournament. P. 100. They reason that "[sle long as losers receive total
compensation substantially less than winners, the incentive effect of the tournament will remain." Id.;
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instances, covering much of the last century, in which large firms
employed attorneys on an indefinite, continuing basis,5" and the authors
conclude that it is "easy to overestimate the rigor with which the up-or-out
rule was in fact applied."52 Galanter and Palay then perceptively make
the seemingly correct argument that recent trends within the legal
profession favoring creation of staff attorney positions and nonequity
partnerships53 are not employment innovations, but current-day continua-
tions of a tradition of permanent nonpartner employment. 4
Similarly, the authors cast doubt on the proposition that the "classic
pattern of dividing the proceeds of the big-firm partnership was some
approximation of giving each partner an equal share-or a share by
seniority (the so-called 'lockstep' system). " ' With citation to authority
sufficiently obscure that the reader is unlikely to have read it, Galanter and
Palay write: "If this [theory of compensation based on equality or
seniority] was ever true, by circa 1960 the prevailing practice was to divide
profits according to individualized shares rather than by a norm of equal
participation."56 The implicit suggestion is that the "eat what you kill"
theory of partner compensation-which some writers have strongly
identified with the 1970s and 1980s 57 -may have a considerably earlier
origin.
Other incidental points in Galanter and Palay's history of large law
firms are equally illuminating. In their discussion of the golden age of
large firms circa 1960, the authors refer to a prior "wave of European and
see p. 100 n.46 (observing that the up-or-out promotion system "has not prevented firms from having
a cadre of well-paid permanent associates").
51. See pp. 28-29, 64 n.168; cf. p. 35 (noting "less up-or-out pressure" in firms outside New
York).
52. P. 28; see p. 100 n.46 ("Mhe up-or-out promotion system has been more a paradigm than
a hard-and-fast rule. Its administration, except for a period during the 1960s and 1970s, has not
prevented firms from having a cadre of well-paid permanent associates.").
53. See p. 64; Johnson & Coyle, supra note 2, at 370-72; see also Barbara Lyne, Diversity
Increases, Rate of Growth Slows, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1990 (Supp.), at S2, S2 (asserting that the
nonpartner tiers of of-counsel attorneys, contract partners, senior associates, and special attorneys
emerged around 1985).
54. See p. 64 ("In the early 1970s permanent associates were described as 'a dying breed ....'
But before the end of the decade, the institution was reinvented."); p. 29 ("[I]t was not to be long
before [permanent associates] were phased back in.").
55. P. 31. One authority asserts that the equal share theory continues to have "many adherents."
See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination,
and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1785 (1990) ("[Many of America's largest and most
prosperous law firms have long followed a practice of sharing the partnership's earnings equally among
all partners of a given age, regardless of individual productivit .").
56. P. 31 (citing ROGER SIDDALL, A SURVEY OF LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 43,
48 (1956)).
57. C. Samuelson & Jaffe, supra note 5, at 196 (indicating that recent trade publications have
recommended "marginal product ('eat what you kill')" compensation methods).
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Washington [branch] offices [that] had been largely abandoned"58 and to
the use of "temporary lawyers"59 to deal with fluctuations in de-
mand-once again suggesting that phenomena commonly associated with
the last decade have older historical antecedents."
I. The Theory of Exponential Growth
The latter half of Tournament of Lawyers is devoted to a detailed
examination of the authors' principal contention, namely that the promotion
practices of large firms inevitably entail exponential growth.61  In
addressing that subject, the book dramatically changes personality. The
reading becomes slow, the argument complex, and the use of technical
jargon apparently indispensable.62 So abrupt is the transformation from
the lucid, easy-going historical treatment offered in the first half of the
work, one might think that the latter chapters were written by different
authors.
The change of style is more than a matter of inconvenience for the
reader, for it impedes assessment of the validity and significance of the
authors' thesis on law firm growth. Only after the reader has cleared a
path through the dense vegetation of graphs, equations, and what Julius
Getman might call "scholarly voice"' is it possible to weigh the argu-
58. P. 23.
59. P. 30.
60. Cf. pp. 47-48 (discussingrecent growth of foreign offices and of branch offices in Washington
and other cities); Johnson& Coyle, supra note 2, at 363 n.12 (collecting sources discussing the recent
growth of domestic and foreign branch offices); id. at 368 n.30, 375 n.65 (discussing the creation of
temporary lawyer placement agencies beginning around 1984 and the "increased" use of temporary
lawyers during the late 1980s).
61. The authors use the term "exponential growth" to mean growth that results from a "constant
percentage increase." P. 87.
62. Examples of the authors' use of specialized language abound: "That is, taking advantage of
the nonrival aspects of surplus human capital results in interdependencies that create substantial risks
for the lender." P. 96. And again:
We can see how well the traditional story approximates the actual data by
estimating the intercept and slopes of the kinked linear function (KLF) that best fit the
growth history of each of the law firms in our sample. Visual comparisons of the
representative curves drawn from these estimates and simple statistical tests of goodness
of fit can give us some gross indicators of how well the kinked linear model performs as
an estimate of individual law-firm growth patterns.
P. 78.
63. Distinguishing "scholarly voice" from "professional voice," "critical voice," and "human
voice," Professor Getman writes:
The law reviews are currently filled with articles written in scholarly voice and covering
a broad political and intellectual spectrum. Their common thread is the use of nonlegal
scholarship as the point of departure.
... [S]cholarly voice tends to be far removed from the emotions, language, and
understanding of the great majority of human beings ....
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ments. In the end, it appears that the authors' account of big firm growth
is premised on ideal conditions, which do not exist in contemporary law
practice. Thus, even assuming that the authors are able to persuasively
explain past growth patterns, it is difficult for their model to illuminate
current events.
A. The Empirical Data
In their effort to understand changes in law firm size, the authors have
assembled an impressive array of data about two groups of large firms.
Group I consists of 50 firms that numbered among the very largest in the
country in 1986; Group II encompasses another 50 firms that in 1988
ranked roughly between the 200th and 250th largest."a The growth
patterns of those firms were determined by the authors from past listings
in Martindale-Hubbell.' Not surprisingly, the historical information
obtained by those efforts confirms the widely held belief that in recent
years large firms have grown at unprecedented rates.
With the aid of graphs, tables, and regression formulas, the authors
draw two conclusions from the data: first, that the growth patterns of the
firms in the study are exponential rather than linear; second, that beginning
around 1970 the pace of exponential growth quickened.' These conclu-
sions cause the authors to reject what they describe as the "shock theory"
of recent law firm growth.61 According to that theory, an "external
shock" around 1970 caused a dramatic increase in firm growth, which until
that time had been best described by straight lines sloping gently up-
ward.68 Instead, the authors see recent growth as the product of two
factors: (1) the inherent tendency of large firms to grow exponentially due
to the manner in which they are structured;6 9 and (2) nonstructural forces
that have hastened the rate of exponential expansion.' Thus, the authors
argue that much of the recent explosion in law firm size is traceable to the
The fantasies that scholarly voice suggests are those of the author as a careful
scientist, coolly examining the workings of the legal system to make it more rational, or
as a dedicated intellectual whosebroad familiarity with contemporary learning permits her
to analyze the system without falling prey either to the sophistries of the courts or the
assumptions of traditional scholarship.
Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66 TEXAs L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1988).
64. See pp. 22, 143-44.
65. See pp. 140-43.
66. See pp. 87-88.
67. See p. 87 ("All agree that firms are much larger today than they were even twenty years ago.
But in our view, they did not get that way by a sudden change alone.").
68. See pp. 78, 87.
69. Cf. p. 98 ("We argue that the rapid growth we currently observe relates directly to the specific
governance structure used by law firms to protect shared human assets from opportunistic conduct.').
70. See generally pp. 110-16 (surveying leading theories put forward to account for the accelerated
growth of law firms after 1970).
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nature of the large firm itself; such growth would have taken place even in
the absence of the many external forces that in recent decades have
otherwise transformed the practice of law.7' While outside forces
undoubtedly have catalyzed the explosion, their effect, the authors argue,
is less than supposed by adherents to the "shock" theory. According to
Galanter and Palay, external events simply "kinked" further the upward
growth curves which, in any event, would have grown increasingly
steep 7
2
The authors spend little time attempting to explain the events that may
have "shocked" law firms into more rapid growth after 1970.71 They
speculate that the upward "kink" in growth curves may be attributable to
(1) increases in the supply of lawyers; (2) more frequent law firm mergers;
(3) increased demand for legal services generally, or for corporate work
in particular; (4) changes in the relationship between in-house corporate
counsel and retained outside firms; or even (5) changes in the ways that
businesses use the law and lawyers.7' Content to leave the "kink" issue
to another day,75 the authors devote the bulk of their attention to the
71. See p. 88 ("[B]ig law firms, as presently structured, have a built-in 'growth engine'
responsible for a significant share ofthegrowth 'spurt' witnessed since 1970. In particular, we contend
that roughly half of the growth is a by-product of the mechanisms used by law firms to govern the
sharing of human capital."); p. 107 ("[A] firm that grows exponentially will eventually exhibit large
jumps in membership quite apart from external shocks. We argue, therefore, that these sudden spurts
in law-firm size actually result, in significant part, from the inevitable product of a long-term, historic
process begun on the day the firm institutionalized its promotion tournament.").
72. Qf p. 88 ("[Wlhatever changes occurred in the early 1970s to make law firms grow faster do
not, and probably cannot, entirely explain the growth witnessed either before or after 1970.").
73. The authors candidly acknowledge that their exploration of the "kink" in post-1970 growth
is "hardly exhaustive." P. 110.
74. See pp. 110-16.
75. Seep. 116.
Two other co-authors, including a lawyer who headed the rapid expansion of what was once a
700-plus lawyer firm, have argued that changes in the legal profession have simply "paralleled [those
in] other segments of the economy, in advertising, on Wall Street, in banking, and in the accounting
profession." KUMBLE & LAHART, supra note 6, at 40. They write:
First, more and more American companies, which only a few years before had
concentrated on local and regional markets, were viewing themselves as national concerns.
Advertising, investment banking, commercial banking, accounting, and the law had to
follow their clients' lead and deliver their professional services on a national basis, or risk
losing the clients' business. So, they either opened offices in other parts of the country
or merged their way into new markets ....
Second, clients started to demand more efficient delivery of legal services. The
well-heeled, larger firms.., came up with the significant new capital needed to improve
efficiency .... [I]t was far easier for a firm of seventy-five lawyers to bear the cost of
such improvements than for a firm of twelve ....
Third, the legal profession as a whole was seeing a pronounced trend toward
specialization. As clients' businesses expanded, they needed more and more specialized
services .... [T]hat became a strong impetus to the growth of the firm.
Id. at 40-41.
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question of whether the organizational structure typical of large firms
necessitates exponential growth.
In considering the authors' arguments, it is useful to note that the
empirical data supporting a theory of exponential growth is less than
overwhelming. The authors acknowledge that in terms of describing the
underlying data, a kinked linear function (KLF) model and a kinked expo-
nential function (KEF) model both do a "reasonable job,"76 that "neither
model unambiguously fits the firm-size data better,"' and that it can be
said only "that the KEF model of firm size works as well as the KLF
model."78 The authors' claim that the data shows a pattern of exponential
growth appears to rest primarily on the rather slender reed that when the
ability of the models to predict future growth is compared, using data
gathered through 1986,19 "the KEF model is a better predictor of 1988
size."'
B. Promotion Tournaments and the Sharing of Human Capital
Galanter and Palay subscribe to the view, commonly identified with
Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, that lawyers organize law firms and
employ promotion tournaments in part because such arrangements permit
an efficient sharing of human capital."1 In the simplest of terms, human
capital is the talent, training, reputation, or relationships n that allow a
lawyer to attract business. A lawyer who can bring in more clients than
he or she personally can serve has excess human capital.' To the extent
that such resources can be shared,' 4 the lawyer's income can be increased






81. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and HowPartners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313
(1985); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The
Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1989); see also B. Peter Pashigian,
Comment [on Gilson & Mnookin], 37 STAN. L. REV. 393 (1985) (suggesting that the implications of
Gilson and Mnookin's sharing model be tested with additional data).
82. See pp. 89-90.
83. See p. 90 (defining "surplus human capital" as "more capital assets than [attorneys] can
productively use by themselves"); see also p. 91 ("An attorney may find herself with surplus human
capital as a result of the constraints on her personal supply of labor, which is ultimately fixed by the
working hours in the day."); p. 92 ("All attorneys have some human capital. Some have more than
they productively can combine with their own labor to produce additional income.").
84. Not all forms of human capital can be shared. "The owner of certain assets-innate
intelligence, aptitude, intuition, or physical presence-cannot transfer them to others .... But most
attorneys possess a mix of shareable and unshareable assets." P. 91.
85. P. 92.
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deficiencies because they are able to complete more work than they
individually can procure.86  If those persons sell their labor to lawyers
with surplus human capital, they too can increase their incomes. Viewed
in this context, law firms provide an organizational arrangement through
which lawyers with excess human capital (partners) may enlist the services
of lawyers with an excess supply of labor (associates) under conditions that
are mutually beneficial.' As devices for facilitating the borrowing and
lending of human capital, law firms are preferable to external market
mechanisms, because standard law firm practices minimize the transaction
costs associated with the exchange, such as "gathering information, moni-
toring performance, negotiating and communicating agreements, and
protecting against opportunistic behavior."8
According to the authors, law firms increase in size because they
structure themselves around a promotion tournament-a governance
mechanism under which a small number of associates are selected for the
super-reward of partnership after an extended apprenticeship.89 The
tournament creates an incentive for associates to labor diligently on behalf
of the firm * and at the same time provides an opportunity for partners to
scrutinize associates' efforts. 91 The system runs smoothly as long as
associates are able to verify by their own observations' the accuracy of
86. See id. (discussing "[n]et borrowers of human capital').
87. See p. 107 ("The law firm can be viewed as an internal market for the lending and borrowing
of human capital.").
88. P. 93; see generally pp. 94-98 (discussing transaction costs and opportunistic conduct).
89. In the firms studied by the authors, promotion rates during the period from 1950 to 1986
ranged between 5.34% and 8.19%. Seep. 104.
90. See p. 102 ("By promoting some but not all of the associates the firm communicates to them
that it will reward productivity but not shirking; therefore, the associate will exert a maximum effort
to win the contest.').
The significance of partnership as a motivating factor is captured by the following passage:
Partnership is everything to lawyers. When young attorneys come to a firm, the
first thing they want to know is how long it takes to make partner and what are the
criteria. It used to be that once a partner always a partner.... That's less true today
.... Still, partnership remains very important; something all lawyers strive for. It gives
them a sense of status among their peers. It sets the mantle of maturity on them. It
admits them to the world of responsibility and the riches lawyers can accumulate....
What they say binds the firm. It ties them to the destiny of the firm. They are taken
more seriously by clients .... And they can charge more for their time.
KUMBLE & LAHART, supra note 6, at 29.
91. See pp. 99-100 (discussing incentives and monitoring). The authors take a rather sanguine
view of the supervision process, stating: "At least initially, partners carefully watch over associates,
amending and supplementing their work as needed. During this period, partners closely evaluate the
work product and behavior of their newly hired associates and act as quality-control supervisors.' P.
99. Reports from my former students now practicing in large firms suggest that this view of the
process is more myth than reality. C. Debra C. Moss, Law Job Trends, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1990, at 36,
36 (observing that, according to one placement agency, "the competitive environmenthas forced older
lawyers to spend more time in practice and less time training their junior counterparts).
92. See p. 101 (discussing verification by associates of whether a firm has paid out the agreed
Texas Law Review [Vol. 70:537
the firm's implicit assurances that, on average, a given percentage of each
entering class will be promoted after a period of time.'
However, according to the authors, these same factors inevitably
produce law firm growth. 4 Once an associate is promoted to partner, the
firm must hire new associates both (1) to replace the promoted lawyer as
the supplier of the labor needed to maximize the use of other partners'
surplus human capital;95 and (2) to furnish a new supply of labor so that
the firm may fully utilize the newly created partner's surplus human
capital,' which presumably was developed during the apprenticeship and
ultimately recognized by the act of promotion.' These hirings increase
the size of the firm" t-unlike hirings necessary to replace former associ-
ates who depart from the firm after losing the promotion tournament.'
prizes). A firm that reneges on promotion promises risks "adverse reputational and motivational
effects" which may impair both recruitment and productivity. P. 102. It would seem that similar
untoward consequenceswould flow from the relatively recent law firm practice of "firing" unproductive
partners. Cf. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the firing of at least five partners at the Dallas
law firm of Gardere & Wynne). The value of the partnership prize is substantially diminished if the
award comes to be viewed by associates as not permanent, but revocable.
93. See p. 106 ("By its actions toward preceding classes, the firm implicitly tells the associates
what percentage can expect to win promotion.'); p. 101 (noting that it is "essential" to declare in
advance that on average a fixed percentage of associates will be promoted "because it communicates
to associates that it is in the firm's own interest to award the prize of partnership to those who have
produced the largest combined bundle of output, quality, and capital").
94. See p. 99 ("We argue that the mechanism chosen in most firms to monitor performance (and
to reconcile conflicting incentives) has lead [sic] inevitably to a pattern of exponential growth."
(emphasis in original)); see also p. 103 ("The tournament, with its fixed promotion percentage, not
only provides incentives, for associates to work hard, but also usually guarantees that the firm will grow
at least exponentially.").
95. See p. 102 ("[Alt the end of the tournament, the firm must replace... all those who win and
are promoted."); see also p. 107 ("As the firm promotes the designated percentage of associates, it
must replace them and must also hire enough new associates to keep the associate-to-partner atio from
falling." (emphasis in original)).
96. See p. 107 ("The firm needs these additions to the associate pool to support the new partners
by using the new partners' shareable human capital."); p. 103 (noting that a firm's growth from one
year to the next depends in part upon "the number of associates that it must hire the next year to
replace the newly promoted partners and to meet the next period's associate-to-partner ratio" (emphasis
in original)).
97. See p. 100 ("The firm evaluates associates [for partnership based] on their production of two
goods: high-quality legal work and their own human capital.").
The validity of premise (2) stated above in the text is not obvious. For example, one of my
colleagues at St. Mary's University, Professor Geary Reamey, noted on a draft of this review in May
1991:
I seriously doubt this premise. Most partners promoted through the ranks of the
big firm have little or no chance to develop surplus human capital. They are more likely
to continue doing the work originated by the rainmakers for quite some time, ultimately
becoming a replacement for the dead or retired. Many lawyers have careers like this.
A few become rainmakers.
98. See p. 102 ("By replacing promoted attorneys the firm grows by the number of promotions.").
99. See id. ("If the firm fires the losers, then it must also replace them, but their replacement has
the effect of maintaining firm size, not increasing it.").
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New associates then participate in a promotion-to-partner tournament, the
outcome of which will trigger a new round of promotion and hiring, ad
infinitum.1°°
According to the authors, promotion rates tend to remain stable
because the integrity of a firm's compensation package depends upon the
ability of associates to observe promotion percentages over extended
periods of time. That is, promotion rates generally remain constant
because once set they are costly to change."01 Moreover, the ratio of
associates to partners tends also to remain constant or increase, the authors
claim, "because firms generally establish a promotion percentage that will
leave it with partners who have at least as much human capital as the
average of the existing partners."' 2 "To do otherwise would not be in
the interest of the existing partners," for the prohibitive costs of accurately
measuring the productivity of individual partners tends to ensure that firms
base "some percentage, and often a significant percentage, of a partner's
income on the average productivity of the firm."'" "Because the promo-
tion percentage is constant and the associate-partner ratio is constant or
increasing, the firm's percentage growth rate will be constant (exponential)
or increasing (faster than exponential)."" °
C. Doubts About Premises
To be sure, Galanter and Palay's growth thesis is an interesting
intellectual construct. Drawing upon the insights of a number of disci-
plines, it seeks to illuminate employment practices that, despite widespread
use, have generally escaped study. Yet it is far from clear that the authors
are correct in arguing that "the mechanism chosen in most firms to monitor
performance (and to reconcile conflicting incentives) [namely, a promotion
tournament] has lead inevitably to a pattern of exponential growth." 5
As discussed below, the validity of their theory may be questioned on at
least four grounds.
1. Economic Rationality.-To begin with, Galanter and Palay's thesis
of inevitable growth attributes to law firm employment and promotion
practices a degree of economic rationality that is arguably unrealistic.
They argue, for example, that law firms will select as tournament winners
those associates who have amassed the most "significant amounts of both





105. P. 99 (emphasis in original).
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high-quality legal work and human capital,"" ° and that firms will
"hesitate to allow associates with less human capital than the average
partner to win" tournaments for fear of diluting the average amount of
capital per partner." 7
In fact, employment and promotion decisions often have less to do
with the efficient allocation of human capital and labor than with other
considerations. A firm may expand its ranks, or conversely may fail to do
so, not because such actions are economically wise, but because of the
impact those decisions will have on intrafirm allocations of power.' Or
an associate may be promoted based upon the partners' sense of loyalty to
the candidate's relative, friend, or patron,"° or for any of a thousand
other reasons unrelated to efficiency. So too, it is well known that quali-
fied individuals may be denied partnership because of discriminatory prac-
tices. 10 Indeed, recently, there has even been something of a contrary
trend whereby personnel decisions in some firms have been influenced by
efforts to achieve racial and gender diversity by actively advancing the
causes of women and minorities."' Experience counsels that in attempt-
106. P. 100.
107. P. 106.
108. See KUMELE & LAHART, supra note 6, at 224 (asserting that a desirable merger was opposed
and ultimately rejected because one name partner "saw it as a power base that would be loyal to"
another name partner); id. at 216 (asserting that in theyear prior to the collapse of Finley Kumble, the
second largest law firm in the country, "growth had far more to do with the political advantage to be
gained by the partner pushing for opening another office than it did with a rational vision of
expansion").
109. For an example of the converse, see id. at 30 (noting one partner's refusal to admit persons
to partnership to avoid depleting the partnership share of the partner's son).
110. See EISLER, supra note 6, at 114 ("Female lawyers, fooled into thinking that with hard work
they could make partner, found out that the big firms could almost always find a way to dump them,
rather than admit them to the most exclusive club."); Milo Geyelin & Wade Lambert, Law Partnership
Can Be Awarded As Remedy in Discrimination Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1991, at B8 (discussing
remedies for discriminatory denial of partnership); Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking
the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 46 (discussing discriminatory
hiring practices and sexual harassment); Arlynn L. Presser, Law Firm Liable for Sex Bias, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1991, at 24, 24 (discussing a federal court ruling that a female associate was held to a higher
partnership standard than males); Celeste H. Yousoof, For Women, Road to Power Remains Rocky,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 12 ('Women are not considered for positions of prominence as
frequently as men."). See generally KAREN B. MoRELLo, THE INvisiBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER
IN AMERICA, 1638 TO THE PRESENT 194-217 (1986) (discussing women in major law firms).
111. But cf. Jamienne S. Studley, Employment Market: Winners andLosers, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
18, 1991, at 44, 44 (suggesting that the recent economic downturn may cause firms to abandon the
"extra effort of minority hiring programs" and that "slashes in first-year hiring will jeopardize the best
chance for minority candidates to get a foot in the door"). Of course, to the extent that these hiring
moves are a means of obtaining clients, rather than securing social justice, they can be explained as
simply another form of economic rationality. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Changing Faces: Coming to
Terms with Growing Minority Populations, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991, at 54, 56-57 (indicating that active
minority recruitment is often intended to link the firm with important communities of potential clients
or to assuage present clients' concerns about the number of the firm's minority lawyers); id. at 58
On Shared Human Capital
ing to account for human behavior, the presence of noneconomic motives
be neither ignored nor understated.
Moreover, even where decision makers act with economic motiva-
tions, there may be substantial divergences in perspective. An individual
participating in hiring or promotion processes may be less interested in the
firm's interests than in advancing his or her own economic welfare."'
Such motives may lead a person to vote for expanding the ranks with those
from whom personal loyalty may be expected or from whom competition
need not be feared-even if such action is contrary to the economic welfare
of the firm. At the very least, there is reason to question the authors'
belief that promotion-to-partner firms inevitably must grow exponentially
because they seek to maximize the average amount of capital per partner
in hiring or promoting associates. To the extent that lawyers participating
in such decisions are interested in advancing other goals, exponential
growth is not inevitable.
The authors' theory of exponential law firm growth rooted in the
sharing of human capital reminds one of Arthur Leff's comments
concerning Richard Posner's economic analysis of law:
[As] lovely as all of this is, it is still unsatisfactory as anything
approaching an adequate picture of human activity ....
... [S]ubstituting definitions for both facts and values is not
notably likely to fill the echoing void .... [W]e shall have to
continue wrestling with a universe filled with too many things about
which we understand too little and then evaluate them against
standards we don't even have.1 3
2. Obstacles to Veification.-More troubling, perhaps, than the
authors' assumption of economic rationality is the degree to which their
model underestimates the role in law firm growth of such phenomena as
lateral hiring, partner defections, law firm mergers, and spin-offs.
Increased merger activity is briefly discussed by Galanter and Palay as a
factor potentially contributing to the "kink" in post-1970 growth
curves114 or as a means of correcting unbalanced capital-to-labor ra-
("['Ilt behooves every mid-size or large firm, just from a marketing viewpoint, to make sure they are
represented by minorities and women' .... (quoting a minority attorney)).
112. See KUMBLE & LAHART, supra note 6, at 249 (asserting that one large firm's opening of a
Chicago office "could be traced to firm politics not to any rational growth plan" and was attributable
to business from that branch being "credited" to certain partners for purposes of computing salaries).
113. Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 458-82 (1974).
114. See pp. 111-12.
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tios,"15 and there are occasional references in the book to lateral hir-
ing" 6 and the like. For the most part, however, events involving a
firm's gain or loss of attorneys under conditions differing from traditional
recruitment and promotion processes are not integrated into the authors'
thesis of exponential growth." 7 Such omissions would be understandable
in a discussion limited to the large firm world circa 1960, for at that time
such developments were rare. But circumstances have changed. Mergers,
spin-offs, defections, and lateral hiring are now common," 8 and the
import of those features cannot be underestimated by a theory that attempts
to explain developments in contemporary law practice.
Contrary to the authors' seeming implication,"9 these types of
events do not merely add to or subtract from the exponential growth
produced by promotion tournaments. They also call into question basic
assumptions underlying the authors' theory of exponential growth.
Galanter and Palay assert that it is "essential" to the promotion tournament
process that firms pay out the prizes they have promised and that associates
are able to verify such payouts "by observing how the present and
preceding classes fare."" Such observations are possible in a firm
where membership is relatively stable and where hiring and departure
115. Seep. 119.
116. See pp. 103 n.50, 104, 108, 119.
117. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
118. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS at xix (1990) (predicting that the "tumult
will continue for some tine to come"); Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law
and Ethics of Grabbing andLeaving, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) ("Firms are increasingly but
temporary resting places for their partners. Lateral hiring, once confined largely to junior lawyers,
now extends through all levels of a partnership."); Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra
note 5, at 4-5 ("Each year thousands of law firm associates leave the firms for which they have
worked, and then continue to practice law, either on their own or with other attorneys. The same is
true of law firm partners, although the numbers involved are considerably less."); Vincent R. Johnson,
Switching Law Firms-And Taking Clients, TRIAL, Nov. 1989, at 117 ("Today ... law firms merge,
dissolve, or break up into competing partnerships frequently [and thus] attorneys regularly change
firms."); Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61
TEMPLE L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1988) ("It is no longer uncommon to see headlines about lawyers
defecting from their firms .... "); Donald R. McMinn, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New
Justification for Increased Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1990) (noting the "surge in attorney mobility"); cf. p. 55 n.120 (noting that "about
100 firms dissolved in 1987, including about a dozen with more than thirty lawyers").
119. See pp. 104-05 (suggesting that increased lateral hiring of partners may act as a "shock"
which "kinks" the growth rate).
120. P. 101. The authors explain the verification process:
Each year, the associates can observe who actually wins and determine whether this
correspondsto the promotion percentages they have come to expect. If the associates see
the promotion percentage decline, they likely will not develop strong expectations about
its ultimate level as their tournament draws to a close. Moreover, a firm that (implicitly)
advertises one promotion percentage, but then unpredictably lowers it at the end of the
tournament, will have difficulty recruiting in the future.
Pp. 106-07.
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occur for the most part along predictable lines in connection with the
partnership tournament. However, the same is not true in less stable
environments where partners defect or are brought on board laterally,
where associates are hired from other firms and given credit toward
partnership, or where whole departments or groups of attorneys defect
from a firm or are added to it. In such situations, it becomes difficult, if
not impossible, to track with confidence the data indicating whether a firm
has lived up to its promises. Moreover, the problem of verification is
exacerbated where, as is ever more frequently the case, associates work in
different branch offices with little opportunity to observe or become
acquainted with one another."' This is especially true where offices are
not in geographic proximity and where associates lack prior acquaintance
through law school or otherwise.
Presumably, even in unstable circumstances, associates will be able to
determine whether any associates at all are promoted to partner over a
given period of time. But it is an entirely different matter whether those
observers will be able to ascertain that, "on average, [the firm has lived up
to its agreement to] promote a fixed percentage."" To the extent that
associates cannot "easily"1" make that determination due to the frequen-
cy of mergers, spin-offs, defections, and lateral hires, the percentage of
promotions may rise or fall, temporarily or otherwise. To the extent that
variable promotion rates exist, there is reason to question the authors'
thesis of exponential growth, for, as they admit, their theory rests upon the
proposition that a constant promotion percentage will produce a constant
percentage growth rate. 124
3. Declining Human Capital.-Another difficulty with the theory of
exponential growth involves an assumption that Galanter and Palay make
concerning surplus human capital. In general, they appear to take the
position that, at least in aggregate, the surplus human capital of any group
of existing partners remains constant or increases over an extended period
of time."z This view, though not explicitly stated, seems to underlie a
121. See Johnson& Coyle, supra note 2, at 363 n.12 (listing sources that discuss or document the
trend toward branch offices).
122. P. 101; see p. 107 ("[Our theory] does not require a firm to adhere strictly to a given
promotion percentage, but rather suggests that, on average, the promotion percentage cannot decline
over time without the firm experiencing adverse morale or recruiting effects.").
123. The authors' model assumes that "the associate easily can verify that the firm pays out the
agreed-to prizes by observing how the present and preceding classes fare." P. 101.
124. See p. 103 ("If the promotion percentage remains constant over time, the firm will grow at
an exponential rate (constant percentage growth rate) if the associate-to-partner ratio remains
constant.").
125. A related, but presumably less significant, concern relates to the authors' assumption that
newly promoted partners have surplus human capital, the full utilization of which requires the firm to
1991] 557
Texas Law Review [Vol. 70:537
number of the authors' arguments. 126 In one such line of reasoning, the
authors assert that in order to maximize financial return, a firm must hire
new associates to take the place of those who are promoted and must
maintain at least a constant ratio of pretournament associates to pretour-
nament partners; otherwise, those "partners would share their surplus
human capital with fewer associates."127
Undoubtedly, many situations will warrant an assumption of steady or
increasing surplus human capital. For example, as years pass, a partner
may become so well recognized in a field, or may develop such extensive
relations with potential clients, that the only reasonable conclusion is that
even after allowances are made for enhancements in the partner's ability
to serve clients efficiently, the partner has maintained or increased personal
unused human capital. In other situations, however, a similar conclusion
hire additional associates. See p. 107. As the authors acknowledge, an associate might be promoted
based not on accrual of human capital, but on her or his attainment of an "extremely high" level of
"high-quality legal work." P. 100. To the extent that this promotion criterion applies, there is no need
to hire new associates, for the new partner has no surplus capital to share. Presumably, the new
partner can continue to supply the labor necessary to take full advantage of the surplus human capital
of other partners. See supra note 97.
126. See p. 103 ("[O]ur claim that firms will tend to grow (at least) exponentially depends upon
our argument that each firm's promotion percentage remains reasonably constant and the ratio of
associates to partners either remains constant or increases."); p. 106 ("The associate-to-partner ratio
tends to remain constant or to increase because firms generally establish a promotion percentage that
will leave it with partners who have at least as much human capital as the average of the existing
partners.").
The authors do recognize the possibility that, on average, human capital per partner may decline.
Thus, for example, they say:
[Wihether a firm can increase the number of associates per partner from one period to the
next depends upon whether the human capital per partner has increased. Conversely, the
firm must reduce the associate-partner atio if capital per partner declines.
P. 105 (emphasis added). However, this language does not contradict the authors' tendency to
disregard the possibility that the personal human capital of partners may decline. Rather, the language
reflects the authors' view of the consequences that follow from new promotions. Shortly after the
language quoted earlier in this footnote, the authors continue:
The amount of human capital the new partners bring to the firm ... influences both the
amount of human capital per partner and, consequently, the associate-to-partner ratio in
the post-tournament period. If the firm sets the promotion percentagetoo high, the firm's
average capital per partner will decrease ....
P. 106.
127. P. 102. The relevant passage is in full:
If the firm did not hire associates to replace its newly promoted partners, then the
pretournamentpartners would share their surplus human capital with fewer associates and,
therefore, make less money. To maintain at least a constant ratio of pretournament
associates to pretournament partners, the firm must hire new associates to take the place
of those who won the tournament.
Id. At anotherjuncture in the text, the authors argue: "As the firm promotes the designated percentage
of associates, it must replace them and must also hire enough new associates to keep the associate-to-
partner ratio from falling." P. 107 (emphasis in original). They then add in a footnote: "Allowing
the associate-per-partner ratio to decline would invariably reduce per-partner profits. Firms do, of
course have this option, but we suspect they will resist it." P. 107 n.57.
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is less reasonable. Malpractice and grievance actions may damage a
partner's reputation; rainmaking abilities may be diminished by physical
illness or senility; once-promising relations with potential clients may
wither for reasons unrelated to the attorney's health or quality of work.
In these and like circumstances, a lawyer's ability to attract business will
decline, and so too will surplus human capital. Moreover, in many
instances, a firm's aggregate human capital will be diminished by partners'
deaths or by defections from the firm," and, as indicated earlier, newly
promoted partners may have little or no surplus human capital.129 Conse-
quently, there is little reason to suppose that in all or even most situations,
a firm's aggregate surplus human capital will remain steady or will expand.
If human capital declines, it is not necessary to maintain a constant or
increasing ratio of associates to partners to fully use human capital. More
specifically, any realistic possibility of a decline in a firm's surplus human
capital undermines the authors' contention that large firms "must grow
exponentially," 1" for as they recognize, their "claim that firms will tend
to grow (at least) exponentially depends upon [their] argument that each
firm's promotion percentage remains reasonably constant and the ratio of
associates to partners either remains constant or increases."13
In an effort to bolster their argument that firms are compelled to
maintain constant or increasing associate-to-partner ratios, the authors cite
evidence in their study of 100 large firms that such ratios historically have
held steady or have tended to increase.132 However, such data do not
show that a large firm inevitably must maintain a constant or increasing
ratio to fully use surplus human capital. Rather, the study indicates simply
that firms with constant or increasing associate-to-partner ratios tend to
grow large.
4. Economic Downturns and Insufficient Demand.-The authors'
theory of exponential growth is open to question on the ground that it
underestimates the role in growth of bad economic conditions. In positing
their supply-side model of law firm employment practices, the authors
"assume that revenue ... constraints will not hinder a firm's growth."1 33
Acknowledging that such an assumption is "[c]learly ... unrealistic," they
128. C. p. 107 ("So long as the number of promotions exceeds the number of departures from
the partnership, each promotion to partner will lead to net increases in both the number of partners and
the number of associates at the firm." (emphasis added)).
129. See supra notes 125-126.
130. P. 88 (emphasis in original).
131. P. 103.
132. See id. (citing as sources for their study Martindale-Hubbell and the National Law Journal's




explain that it is made for "expositional convenience," and they promise
to "relax" the assumption later in the discussion."'4 When the authors
finally return to the subject of demand, they say little to indicate that they
fully appreciate its significance. Galanter and Palay recognize that a
"'revenue gap' . . . might exist in any firm at any stage of growth," 3 '
and they offer a thoughtful discussion of three options for coping with such
a gap: stretching existing income to cover more attorneys; reducing the
firm's growth rate; or increasing the demand for legal services. 36 Yet
one is left with a sense that the authors regard insufficient demand as a
relatively rare occurrence-one largely unrelated to what associates expect,
or to what partners do, concerning hiring and promotion.37
In fact, law firms are routinely faced with fluctuations in the demand
for legal services and in their ability to collect revenue . 31 Localities and
regions suffer economic downturns; clients' businesses falter; bills for
previous services unexpectedly become worthless. Such occurrences are
not deviations from the norm. Rather they are part of the practice of law,
and they occur with regularity.1 39  The prospect or reality of worsening
economic conditions is a factor that law firms, like other businesses, must
take into account in making personnel decisions."' As recent develop-
ments indicate, it is unrealistic to assume that, faced with a grim economic
climate, a firm will slavishly adhere to a preordained associate-to-partner
134. Id.; see also p. 37 (acknowledging that "[c]hanges in the legal world reflect changes in the
surrounding economy").
135. P. 117.
136. See pp. 117-20.
137. In contrast, the authors are willing to entertain the possibility that law firm growth may
largely be a function of increased demand. They write:
[O]ne might argue that the law-firm growth curves simply mimic the growth in demand
for big law firm services. That is, law firms might havegrown exponentially becausethe
demand for their services has grown exponentially. This is an intriguing hypothesis but
one whose exploration is hampered by a lack of available data.
P. 88 n.17.
138. Seep. 117; Ellen J. Pollock, Big Law Firms Learn That They, Too, Are a Cyclical Business,
WALL ST. I., Aug. 15, 1991, at Al (discussing the recent "recession" in the legal profession as
contradicting big law firms' beliefs that "they were immune to hard times" and that "demand for legal
work would grow forever").
139. Cf Mara Tapp, Hiring in a Recession, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991, at 70 (discussing law firm
hiring in "the bullish 'SOs" and "the bearish '90s").
140. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Tough Times Bring Out the Flunk Curve, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18,
1991, at 13 ("Tough times are ahead [and will] inevitably require staff cutbacks, including lawyers.");
Amy Boardman, Akin, Gump Is Latest Dallas Finn to Fire Partners, TEx. LAW., Mar. 18, 1991, at
3 ("The lack of business generation and a lagging demand by some of the firm's major clients led to
the dismissals [of six partners, eight associates, and twelve support staffers]."); Tapp, supra note 139,
at 70 ("Anytime the economy has the jitters, law firms, as businesses, react. Lawyers are conservative
and they're going to be decreasing the size of their summer programs or, if not that, not increasing
them."); cf. Kenneth Rutman, Most Firms Put Brakes on Starting Salary Hikes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24,
1990 (Supp.), at S3, S3 (reporting that economic conditions have led many leading law firms not to
increase the starting salary for new associates).
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ratio, rather than reduce the number of new lawyers being added to the
ranks.14' Yet that position is essentially the one taken by the authors.
Having constructed an exponential growth model, which requires a constant
or increasing associate-to-partner ratio, the authors are forced to treat
departures from the model as aberrations. Somewhat surprisingly, they
state that a reduction in the ratio of associates to partners driven by a
"revenue gap" is a "change in the underlying structure of the firm.""4 2
Their discussion suggests that this change is not unlike such other structural
changes as the "wide[ning] use of nonequity partnerships, paralegals,
'temporary' attorneys, 'second-tier' associates with no expectation of
making partner, and the practice of retaining as permanent associates those
passed over for partnership."43 Whether other persons would regard a
decline in the associate-to-partner ratio as such a fundamental change in the
141. See Boardman, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting that a 195-lawyer Dallas law firm laid off 25
attorneys dueto economic conditions); DonJ. DeBenedictis, Recruiting Decline, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1991,
at 22, 22 (noting that "recruiting at law schools was noticeably down last fall"); Ken Myers, Latest on
the Recession Front: Firns Rescind Offers to Students, NAT'L L.J, June 24, 1991, at 4 (discussing the
revocation of offers to law students for summer associate and full-time positions); Tapp, supra note
139, at 70 ("The current economic climate-downturn or recession, choose your term-is making law
firms take a much more conservativeapproach to hiring."); see also Gary Taylor& Edward A. Adams,
More Layoffs, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 1991, at 2 (discussing the layoffs of associates and partners in
Dallas and New York); Lyric, supra note 53, at 52 (noting that "the spectacular growth that seemed
endless in the last half of the 1980s, especially in New York City, has been curtailed-and in some
cases severely"). But see Studley, supra note 111, at 44 ("Recruiting the best possible talent and
training them to provide top service is like oiling and honing valuable machinery. No good manager
cuts maintenance, even in a depressed market.").
142. Pp. 117-18.
143. P. 118. The authors state in relevant part:
When [a] revenue gap develops, the firm must change to survive....
A second strategy suggests that the firm attempt to reduce its growth rate .... For
any given per capita partnership income, the growth rate of the firm is generally a
function of four variables: (1) the ratio of associates to partners, (2) the percentage of
associates becoming partners, (3) the length of time between joining the firm as an
associate and becoming a partner, and (4) the number of partners leaving the firm ....
Changing any of these variables results in an adjustment in the growth of the firm ....
Adjusting any of the first three variables also implies a change in the underlying
structure of the firm-such adjustments, that is, portend the transformation of the practice.
In fact, ... we presently witness substantial efforts in this area. For instance, the
percentage of associates becoming partners seems to be declining in some firms and the
years to partnership have lengthened. In addition, law firms now make wider use of
nonequity partnerships, paralegals, "temporary" attorneys, "second-tier" associates with
no expectation of making partner, and the practice of retaining as permanent associates
those passed over for partnership.
Pp. 117-18. The authors opine that "slowing a firm's growth potential ... creates difficulties in
recruitment, compensation, motivation and retention of productive young associates." P. 118.
Although this may be true in the case of an isolated "revenue gap," there is reason to think that a firm
will not have any serious difficulty in recruiting and keeping qualified lawyers if a reduction in the
associate-to-partner ratio is the result of a downturn in the economy at large that has affected large
firms generally. In such circumstances, actual or aspiring associates will be unable to do better
elsewhere by joining a different large firm.
Texas Law Review
structure of a firm is at least open to question, because it does not affect
any of the factors the authors use at the beginning of the book to distin-
guish large firms from other kinds of practice: the status differences
between partners and associates; the types of clients; the nature of the
work; the support systems and kinds of information used to render legal
services; and the phenomena of promotion tournaments. 144  At a mini-
mum, one must ask whether it is useful in understanding the growth of
large firms to adopt a model that ignores bad economic news.
IV. Synthesis
If Galanter and Palay err, it is in stating their thesis too strongly. As
their book makes plain, there are indeed "pressures for growth inherent in
the structure of law firms," and those pressures undoubtedly have
contributed to the organizational problems many firms now face as part of
the "resulting struggle to accommodate increased size."14 However, in
their arguments that traditional large-firm practices make rapid expansion
"inevitabl[ef"" and that firms employing those practices "must grow
exponentially,"' 7 the authors place more weight on the facts than the
evidence will bear. To state their thesis so emphatically, the authors must
construct a model that ignores too many realities and, as a result, speaks
too faintly to the actual conditions of modern law practice. What good is
it to articulate a model based on economic rationality, low attorney
mobility, steady or expanding human capital, and continuing prosperity in
a world where decisions are often made on noneconomic grounds, where
attorneys routinely switch firms and take clients with them, where human
capital declines, and where bad economic news is not uncommon? Would
it not be better to state simply that some existing factors tend strongly to
favor rapid growth and that in some cases these factors may produce expo-
nential expansion?'48
144. See generally pp. 4-11. A similar argument might be made concerning revenue-gap-driven
decisions to lengthen the partnership track or to alter the promotion percentage. Such moves are not
fundamental changes in the structure of a firm. Indeed, the authors' discussion suggests that the length
of the partnership track at given firms expanded and contracted prior to and during the "golden age"
circa 1960. Seep. 27.
145. P. 77.
146. P. 99 (emphasis in original); see pp. 88-89 ("The number of lawyers working for a firm
inevitably will increase by a constant (or possibly increasing) percentage."); see also p. 87 ("Law firms
have moved steadily toward the gargantuan since the inception of the modem firm around the turn of
this century.").
147. P. 88 (emphasis in original); seep. 102 ("The promotion-to-partnertournament... contains
an internal dynamic that explains why firms must grow. Growth occurs because, at the end of the
tournament, the firm must replace not only the losing associates who depart, but all those who win and
are promoted." (emphasis added)).
148. In fairness, it should be noted that although the authors' argument is frequently phrased in
the imperative language of what a firm "must" do and what results are "inevitable," they sometimes
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The authors appear to recognize dimly the tensions between their
model and the realities of contemporary law practice. Thus, at one
interesting juncture, near the conclusion of the presentation of their model,
the authors are compelled to distinguish "must" from "can," stating
unpersuasively by way of clarification: "We have argued that, as tradition-
ally organized, the big law firm must grow. We have essentially ignored
the question of whether the firm can grow by assuming that the firm faces
no constraints to becoming bigger." 149
The last part of the authors' book ruminates on the future shape of
legal practice.1" Whether the authors are correct in those musings is less
important than that they have diligently documented the history of large
firms and articulated a theory that helps to explain the internal dynamics
of such enterprises. Galanter and Palay have succeeded in emphasizing the
"structural component of [law firm] growth" and in making a case for the
view that "as firms have grown they simply have outpaced earlier methods
of monitoring and coordinating personnel, recruiting associates, and
generating revenues."151 Although their theory is open to question on a
number of grounds, 7burnament of Lawyers is a valuable book which
deserves to be read and carefully considered. If not the final word on the
growth of big law firms, it nonetheless makes important contributions to
a better understanding of the ongoing transformation of the American legal
profession.
speak in less strident tones. For example, they say that their "claim [is] that firms will tend to grow
(at least) exponentially." P. 103 (emphasis added); see also p. 3 ("If the environment permits, the firm
that employs ... [a promotion-to-partner] tournament will tend to grow exponentially." (emphasis
added)).
149. P. 116 (emphasis in original).
150. See generally pp. 121-38. They opine that there will likely be a "period of fluidity and
experimentation," p. 121, and that a likely common form of practice will be what they refer to as the
"Later Big Firm," p. 122, a firm in which "the 'promotion-to-partnership' core would be reduced (in
relation to the total mass of the firm) by [such] devices for slowing the effects of the promotion-to-
partner tournament [as] two-tier hiring, permanent associates, paralegals and technology, contracting
out, and general stretching out of time to partnership." P. 122 (footnote omitted). The authors
speculate that one variation of the Later Big Firm may be "giant national (or international) firms that
bear some resemblance to the 'Big Six' accounting firms in size, structure, and market concentration."
P. 122 (footnote omitted). They also suggest that it may be reasonable to expect "accountants and
other professionalsto offer legal services," and for the Later Big Firm to engage in a 'multidisciplinary
or 'diversified' law practice." P. 124. Alongside large law firms, Galanter and Palay write, it is likely
there will be an array of highly specialized 'boutiques," pp. 125-27, 'mixed-compensation or 'life-
style' firms," p. 127, firm 'networks' or 'affiliation groups," p. 130, subcontracting arrangements,
pp. 130-3 1, and expanded in-house law departments, pp. 131-32.
151. P. 77.
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